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THE TENSIONS BETWEEN REGULATING WORKPLACE




I am happy to address the important subject of this year's Ken-
neth M. Piper Lecture-the tensions between regulating workplace
harassment and the First Amendment. This topic has long been of
concern to me both in my academic capacity and in my capacity as
President of the American Civil Liberties Union. I first wrote about
these tensions in 1992,1 when they had received almost no scholarly
attention, 2 and the ACLU has been discussing them since a decade
earlier, in the process of adopting and refining policy statements and
formulating positions in various cases around the country.3
I-and the ACLU-consider the subject to be especially chal-
lenging because we have always strongly supported both rights at is-
* This essay is based on the oral presentation of the Kenneth M. Piper Lecture at the
Chicago-Kent College of Law on April 11, 1995.
** Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Civil Liberties Union.
For research assistance with this Essay, the author thanks Donna Wasserman, Alexander Jeffrey,
Raafat S. Toss, and Theo Davis. She is also grateful for the information and insights provided by
Deborah Ellis, Deborah Epstein, Paul Hoffman, Ann Kappler, and Laura Stein.
1. Nadine Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment and Upholding the First
Amendment-Avoiding a Collision, 37 VILL. L. REV. 201 (1992); Nadine Strossen, Sexual Har-
assment in The Workplace: Accommodating Free Speech and Gender Equality Values, in FREE
SPEECH YEARBOOK 1 (1993).
2. At the time the only law review articles on the subject were Kingsley R. Browne, Title
VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
481 (1991) [hereinafter Browne I] and Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 33-41 (1990). Since then the relevant law review publications have been
increasing. See Kingsley R. Browne, Workplace Censorship: A Response to Professor Sangree, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 579 (1995) [hereinafter Browne II]; Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in
a Hostile Environment: A Primer on Free Speech and Sexual Harassment, 68 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1003 (1993); Suzanne Sangree, A Reply to Professors Volokh and Browne, 47 RUTGERS L.
REV. 595 (1995); Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 461 (1995);
Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 563 (1995)
[hereinafter Volokh I]; Amy Horton, Comment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds and Censorship:
Sexual Harassment, The First Amendment, and the Contours of Title VI, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV.
403 (1991); Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992) [hereinafter Volokh II].
3. See ACLU, PoLicY GUIDE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Policy No. 316
(rev. ed. 1995) [hereinafter ACLU POLICY GUIDE].
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sue: the right to be free from gender-based discrimination at work4
and the right of free expression, including in the workplace. 5 We are
particularly concerned about rights of non-discrimination at work
now, in light of the many recent attacks on affirmative action,6 and in
light of the "Glass Ceiling Commission" report,7 and other recent
studies that indicate that bias and prejudice still hamper the advance-
ment of women and members of racial minorities in the workplace.
8
I will first outline the essential elements of both important rights
at issue. I will then address the central challenge faced by those of us
who refuse to automatically exalt one such right above the other: how
to distinguish workplace expression that is protected free speech from
4. See generally Nadine Strossen, The American Civil Liberties Union and Women's Rights,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940 (1991) (outlining the history of the ACLU's work in support of women's
rights since its founding in 1920, including its Women's Rights Project and Reproductive Free-
dom Project).
5. See ACLU POLICY GUIDE, supra note 3, at Policy No. 53, FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF
CORPORATE EMPLOYEES:
In all cases, the employee's rights to free speech and association should be limited only
by minimal and traditionally acceptable time, place and manner regulations, provided
that the employee's exercise of the right does not substantially, materially and directly
interfere with his or her bona fide job performance, or substantially, materially and
directly obstruct other employees. This should not protect speech which directly inter-
feres with the ability of the employee adequately to perform his/her job.
Id. Much of the ACLU's work on behalf of employees' free speech rights is carried out through
its national Workplace Rights Task Force.
6. See Affirmative Action: University of California Regents Ban Affirmative Action in Hir-
ing, Admissions, DAILY LAB. REP., July 24, 1995, at A10 ("University of California regents voted
[by a vote of 15-10] to end affirmative action programs in hiring, contracting, and admissions at
the nine-campus university system."); Diana Kunde, Women's Group to Oppose Affirmative Ac-
tion Revisions, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 21, 1995, at 4D ("Sen. Phil Gramm... promised
to overturn federal executive orders on affirmative action programs as his first action if elected
president."); David Lightman, Franks to Lead Battle in Congress: Attack to Target Affirmative
Action, HARTFORD COURANT, July 13, 1995, at A3 (African-American Congressman Gary A.
Franks leads House Republicans in effort to delete provisions for set-aside programs.); Bob
Minzesheimer, Affirmative Action Under Fire: Debate rages as GOP offers preview of '96, USA
TODAY, Feb. 23, 1995, at 4A (reporting that one poll has two-thirds of respondents opposing
affirmative action, and another poll has 73% of Californians supporting the California Civil
Rights Initiative, which would outlaw affirmative action); States' Legislative Action: State Legisla-
tures Respond to Affirmative Action Uproar, DAILY LAB. REP., Aug. 1, 1995, at D33 ("[T]he
California Rights Initiative .. . seeks to add an amendment to the state constitution prohibiting
discrimination of and preferential treatment given to individuals in public employment, educa-
tion, and contracting on account of race, gender, ethnicity, or national origin."); Phil Willon,
Affirmative Action Faces A Host of Battles, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 20, 1995, at 1 ("There have been
lawsuits filed in several Florida cities attacking affirmative action."); see also Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112-13, 2117 (1995) (holding that set-aside program for mi-
nority contractors is presumptively unconstitutional).
7. U.S. DEP'T OF LAB. GLAsS CEILING COMM'N, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE
OF THE NATION'S HUMAN CAPITAL (1995).
8. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2135 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[D]iscrimination's lingering
effects ... [are] reflective of [a] system of a racial caste only recently ended, are evident in our
workplaces, markets, and neighborhoods. Job applicants with identical resumes, qualifications,
and interview styles still experience different receptions, depending on their race." (citations
omitted)).
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workplace expression that is prohibited harassment. I will explain
why both the Supreme Court and the ACLU have concluded that
there is no single, bright-line test for making this distinction. The only
way to classify any particular workplace expression as either protected
free speech or prohibited harassment is by considering that expression
in its full context, taking into account all the facts and circumstances.
Consistent with that flexible, fact-specific approach, no single factor
characterizing the expression should be dispositive.
Finally, I will discuss problems arising from-the fact that-con-
trary to the foregoing contextual approach-many employers and
some lower courts have erroneously treated one factor as dispositive
in evaluating whether workplace expression is prohibited sexual har-
assment. Specifically, they have deemed any sexually-oriented ex-
pression in the workplace to be sexually harassing, regardless of its
context. This false equation between sexual expression and sexual
harassment violates employees' free speech rights. Moreover, far
from advancing women's right to be free from gender-based discrimi-
nation in employment, ironically, it undermines that vital right in sev-
eral ways by perpetuating paternalistic and disempowering
stereotypes about women, work, and sexuality.
II. RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM DISCRIMINATORY HARASSMENT
AT WORK
Let me start by outlining several key elements of each important
right at issue, beginning with the right to be free from discriminatory
harassment at work. 9
Meaningful equality of opportunity in employment requires more
than mere non-discrimination at the entry level. It is not enough to
simply open the doors of workplaces to women and members of other
groups that have traditionally been excluded. Meaningful equality of
opportunity also entails a full chance to participate and to succeed.
Accordingly, the courts10 and Congress" have recognized that the
9. Consistent with the title of this year's Piper Lecture, I will focus on "sexual harass-
ment," or harassment that is gender-based. My comments are generally applicable, though, to
other forms of discriminatory harassment in employment, such as racial harassment. Likewise,
while my remarks focus on the designated topic of workplace harassment, they are largely appli-
cable to the related subject of campus harassment. Many colleges and universities have adopted
and enforced anti-harassment rules that jeopardize free speech rights. See generally NADINE
STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S
RIG HTs 24-29, 120, 128-29, 131-32, 135-36 (1995).
10. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
11. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 101(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981(b) (Supp. 1992) (prohibiting dis-
crimination in "making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts"), overruling
1995]
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right to equal employment opportunity includes a right to be free
from harassment based on such characteristics as gender or race.
Concerning sexual harassment specifically, the Supreme Court
has endorsed guidelines that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) issued, recognizing two types of such harass-
ment: first, quid pro quo harassment, which occurs when an employ-
ment opportunity or benefit is conditioned on an employee's granting
sexual favors to a supervisor; and second, hostile environment harass-
ment, which occurs when "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual na-
ture... has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment. "12
Expression is at the heart of both forms of harassment, since the
demands for sexual favors involved in quid pro quo harassment, as
well as conduct that creates a hostile environment, generally take the
form of expression. However, First Amendment tensions with the
concept of sexual harassment arise only from the hostile environment
branch of harassment.
Even the most diehard free speech absolutist recognizes that the
speech involved in quid pro quo harassment is tantamount to threats
or extortion,13 expression that has long been punishable without rais-
ing substantial free speech concerns in any context. 14 This is true even
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176-78 (1989) (finding racial harassment not
actionable under Civil Rights Act of 1866 because the Court interpreted the Act as applying only
to contract formation and unlawful dismissal, not to conditions of employment).
12. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985).
13. See Browne I, supra note 2, at 485; Volokh I, supra note 2, at 573; Volokh II, supra note
2, at 1800.
14. See KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBER-
TIES OF SPEECH 78-79 (1995):
Sexual harassment takes two discrete forms, only one of which generates serious First
Amendment questions. One form is called quid pro quo harassment; it typically in-
volves conditioning someone's employment position on her sexual involvement....
[T]his kind of threat alters the situation of the listener. It presents her with a new and
potentially disturbing choice-whether to engage in unwelcome sexual relations or lose
her job. Such situation-altering utterances are not the sort of speech that warrants
protection under a guarantee of free speech.
Id.
Although prohibiting quid pro quo harassment is conceptually consistent with free speech
principles, the danger still remains that such a prohibition could be enforced in a way that vio-
lates free speech principles, by overbroadly stifling expression that should not be deemed quid
pro quo harassment. For example, although the ACLU's policy on free speech and bias on
college campuses does not oppose "disciplinary codes aimed at restricting acts of harassment,
intimidation and invasion of privacy," the policy cautions: "As always, however, great care must
be taken to avoid applying such provisions overbroadly to protected expression. The ACLU will
continue to review such college codes and their application in specific situations on a case-by-
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in public forums-public property such as parks or streets-where
free speech rights are at their apogee.
15
In contrast, hostile environment harassment may well consist of
words or expressive conduct that, outside the workplace context,
would be protected. 16 Nevertheless, some such expression may be
prohibited, consistent with the First Amendment, for several reasons.
First, the mere fact that harassing conduct consists in part of expres-
sion never has been sufficient to immunize it from regulation. Even
we in the ACLU, with our absolutist view of the First Amendment,
never have argued that it protects targeted individual harassment in
the form of expression. For example, although the ACLU has been
the leading opponent of campus hate speech codes that target speech
on the basis of its racist or sexist ideas,17 our policy on this issue ex-
pressly recognizes that universities may prohibit "harassment, intimi-
dation and invasion of privacy.' 8 ACLU policy provides the
following guidelines, which generally pertain to the employment situa-
tion as well, insofar as both require reconciling anti-discrimination
and free speech values:
The ACLU has opposed and will continue to oppose and chal-
lenge disciplinary codes that reach beyond permissible boundaries
into the realm of protected speech, even when those codes are di-
rected at the problem of bias on campus.
case basis under the principles set forth in this policy." ACLU POLICY GUIDE, supra note 3, at
Policy No. 72a (adopted 1990).
15. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 810 n.18, 964-65, 986-87
(1988).
16. See GREENAWALT, supra note 14, at 80:
No one doubts that speech of various sorts can create a working environment that a
woman reasonably experiences as hostile. Furthermore, no one doubts that even civil
expressions, as in a company newsletter, can contribute to such an environment....
On the other hand, expressions of opinion and feeling are normally protected against
government restriction by the First Amendment, even when the speech disturbs others.
This is the constitutional problem about hostile environment harassment. It is most
sharply posed by civil expressions on serious topics that may nonetheless contribute to
an abusive work environment.
Id.
17. See UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Wu v.
University of Conn., No. Civ. H-89-649 PCD (D. Conn. 1990); Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F.
Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (cases in which ACLU represented parties that successfully chal-
lenged campus hate speech codes). I am aware of only one other decision striking down a cam-
pus hate speech code on constitutional grounds, Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp.
477 (E.D. Mich. 1993), affid, 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995). Additionally, a state court judge
recently invalidated Stanford University's hate speech code under a state statute. Corry v. Stan-
ford Univ., No. 740309, Superior Court, Santa Clara, Feb. 27, 1995; see also Bill Workman, Stan-
ford Won't Appeal Ruling On Anti-Hate Speech Rule, S.F. Ci-RON., Mar. 10, 1995, at All.
18. ACLU POLICY GUIDE, supra note 3, at Policy No. 72a, FREE SPEECH AND BIAS ON
COLLEGE CAMPUSES (adopted 1990).
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This policy does not prohibit colleges and universities from en-
acting disciplinary codes aimed at restricting acts of harassment, in-
timidation, and invasion of privacy. Although "harassment,"
"intimidation," and "invasion of privacy" are imprecise terms sus-
ceptible of impermissibly overbroad application, each term defines
a type of conduct which is legally proscribed in .many jurisdictions
when directed at a specific individual or individuals and when in-
tended to frighten, coerce, or unreasonably harry or intrude upon
its target. Threatening telephone calls to a minority student's dor-
mitory room, for example, would be proscribable conduct under the
terms of this policy. Expressive behavior which has no other effect
than to create an unpleasant learning environment, however, would
not be the proper subject of regulation.
The fact that words may be used in connection with otherwise
actionable conduct does not immunize such conduct from appropri-
ate regulation. For example, intimidating telephone calls, threats of
attack, extortion and blackmail are unprotected forms of conduct
which include an element of verbal or written expression. As al-
ways, however, great care must be taken to avoid applying such pro-
visions overbroadly to protected expression. The ACLU will
continue to review such college codes and their application in spe-
cific situations on a case-by-case basis under the principles set forth
in this policy.19
There is a second reason why some workplace expression may be
deemed illegal harassment consistent with the First Amendment.
People who are targets of harassing expression at work may constitute
what the Supreme Court has called a captive audience-persons who
must be in a certain place for an important purpose. Such people may
be protected from unwanted verbal assaults while at work, even if
they would not be protected from the same expression in any other
context. 20
Other special attributes of many workplace settings underscore
the captive situation of many employees, and hence constitute further
reasons why expression that might be protected in other contexts
should not necessarily be protected at work. The first such attribute is
the hierarchical structure of most workplaces, and the fact that some
individuals exercise supervisory and economic power over others. A
second, related attribute of many workplaces is that they often impose
severe limitations on employees' opportunities to engage in speech.
Far from being the quintessential "marketplace of ideas" in which
19. Id.
20. See Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
85, 89-103 (1991). But see id. at 88, 121 (showing how current case law is "riddled with inconsis-
tency and ambiguity," and proposing factors courts should consider in employing the captive
audience concept and balancing it against free speech interests; the goal is to make doctrine "a
method of analysis, not just a catchy slogan").
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speech and counter-speech are freely bandied about, many work-
places are highly regulated environments in which non-work-related
speech is at best discouraged, and at worst, banned or restricted.
Further distinguishing places of work from the marketplaces of
ideas is the fact that a central speech-protective precept that applies in
public forums cannot be transported to the workplace: that the appro-
priate response to speech that listeners find wrongheaded or offensive
is not to suppress or punish the speech, but rather to answer it.21 To
relegate an employee who is the target of insulting, sexist remarks by
her boss to the "remedy" of answering him back is to foreclose her
from any meaningful recourse at all.
For the foregoing reasons, some sexist expression in the work-
place constitutes harassment that may-and, indeed, should-be pro-
hibited and punished, even if the First Amendment would protect the
same expression in other settings. Gender-discriminatory harassment
in employment may not be condoned simply because it is effected
through expression. Free speech rights should not automatically and
mechanically trump equality rights.
III. RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION AT WORK
On the other hand, the ACLU has always advocated free expres-
sion rights of workers. Going back to our earliest days, more than 75
years ago, we championed such rights on the part of pioneering labor
organizers. 22 Given how many waking hours most people spend on
the job, if they do not have speech rights there, then for all practical
purposes, they have very few free speech rights indeed. Accordingly,
the ACLU maintains that all employees should enjoy freedom of ex-
pression while at work, as long as that expression does not substan-
tially interfere with workplace operations. 23
Of course, the First Amendment does not directly bar private sec-
tor employers from restricting their employees' speech, since it di-
rectly constrains only governmental actions. But when private
employers restrict their employees' speech to comply with govern-
ment mandates, including Title VII and EEOC regulations, then the
21. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) ("We can imagine no more appropriate
response to burning a flag than waving one's own."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood
and fallacies ... the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."),
22. See Martha Glaser, Paterson, 1924: The ACLU and Labor, 94 N.J. HIST. 155, 156 (1976);
see also, SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 51
(1990).
23. See ACLU POLICY GUIDE, supra note 3, at Policy No. 53.
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employer is in effect acting as a government agent. Government-insti-
gated speech restrictions are subject to First Amendment constraints
even in the private sector.24
I previously set forth several reasons why some workplace ex-
pression may be restricted as harassment, despite the First Amend-
ment. Underscoring how hard it is to draw bright-line rules in this
area, I will now list several reasons why some workplace expression
may not be restricted as harassment, because of the First Amendment.
First, outside the workplace, the kinds of speech that have been
deemed sexually harassing are clearly entitled to First Amendment
protection. For example, the Supreme Court repeatedly has affirmed
the protected status of expression that is sexual, 25 sexist,26 insulting,27
offensive, 28 and biased.
29
In fact, the Court has stressed that the most egregious First
Amendment violation is what it calls viewpoint-based speech regula-
tion, which restricts speech because of the ideas or viewpoint it con-
24. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), which held that
the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures conducted by a private party which acts
"as an instrument or agent of the Government," id. at 614, and noted that such a relationship
will be found even if "the Government has not compelled a private party to perform a search."
Id. at 615. The Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment did apply to the searches at issue
because "the Government did more than adopt a passive position toward" them, and because
they were not "primarily the result of private initiative." Id.
25. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (striking
down restrictions on "dial-a-porn" as violating Free Speech Clause because "sexual expression
which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment"); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) ("Sex and obscenity are not synonymous.... The portrayal of sex.., is
not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech
and press.").
26. See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), affg 771 F.2d
323 (7th Cir. 1985), affg 598 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Ind. 1984) (summarily affirming lower court
decision). The Seventh Circuit held that the First Amendment was violated by anti-pornography
law aimed at graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures and/or words.
Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 324; see also id. at 425 (quoting anti-pornography statute).
27. See, e.g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (reversing conviction of woman
who said "you god damn mother fucking police" to a police officer); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408
U.S. 914 (1972) (summarily vacating conviction of Black Panther for calling specific policemen
"mother-fucking fascist pig cops"); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972) (reversing con-
viction of black demonstrator who had called a police officer "white son of a bitch").
28. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (reversing conviction for burn-
ing the U.S. flag, although surveys show large majority of Americans are deeply offended by this
expressive conduct); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (same); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971) (reversing defendant's conviction for wearing a jacket that said "Fuck the draft" in a
courthouse).
29. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (reversing conviction for burn-
ing cross on property of African-American family, who had recently moved to previously all-
white neighborhood); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (reversing conviction for racist
speech containing anti-black and anti-semitic statements).
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veys. 30 But sexually harassing expression is restricted precisely
because of its viewpoint-namely, a sexist one. Much as we may ab-
hor a sexist viewpoint, that abhorrence is no justification for suppres-
sion of its expression outside the workplace. The Court stressed this
cardinal free speech principle in its two flag-burning decisions in
198931 and 1990,32 which upheld free speech rights for a viewpoint
that a large majority of Americans found deeply repugnant. 33 The
Court declared: "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expres-
sion of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable."
34
As the preceding discussion makes clear, if we extended generally
applicable First Amendment principles to the workplace, much ex-
pression that has been deemed proscribable harassment would in fact
be protected. For several reasons we cannot simply rely on the cap-
tive audience doctrine to exempt the workplace from the First
Amendment. First, as UCLA Law Professor Eugene Volokh has
noted, "the [Supreme] Court has ... never found that employees in
the workplace are 'captive,' and there are good reasons for it not to do
SO.5935
Further, even if employees could reasonably be viewed as captive
audiences in some contexts, that still would not justify the selective
prohibition or punishment of speech based on its viewpoint. The
Court has never upheld viewpoint-discriminatory regulations under
the captive audience theory. 36 Therefore, current precedents would
30. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.").
31. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
32. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
33. See House Backs Flag-Protection Amendment, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST,
July 13, 1995, at 497 G2 (Public opinion polls indicate that about 75% of voters favor an amend-
ment to ban burning and other disfiguring of the flag.). But see Gail Appleson, REUTERS, Aug.
4, 1995 (ABA poll showed that while 64% of Americans think they want a flag burning amend-
ment, only 38% support such an amendment if it would result in a restriction of free speech and
political protest.).
34. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414.
35. Volokh II, supra note 2, at 1832-33 (noting that Court has never upheld content-based
speech restriction on "captive audience" rationale outside the home).
36. See id. at 1840-43 (citing Supreme Court decisions). Likewise, the ACLU condones
speech regulations to protect captive audiences only when they are content- and viewpoint-
neutral:
[T]he First Amendment is not inconsistent with reasonable regulations designed to re-
strict sensory intrusions so intense as to be assaultive. Reasonable regulations are
those that apply only to time, place and manner without regard to content .... What
constitutes a "reasonable" regulation will necessarly vary depending upon such factors
1995]
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not warrant the selective restriction of workplace speech that conveys
discriminatory attitudes toward women.37
Additionally, as Columbia Law School Professor Kent Greena-
walt has noted, in the workplace, the captive audience concern is off-
set by a captive speaker concern, which weighs against regulation and
in favor of free speech. He explains:
When people are working, the only place they can express them-
selves is within the workplace. The speakers are no more free to go
elsewhere than the audience. If I spend most of the day in the office
and I like to look at provocative pictures of nude women, there is
no substitute for my hanging such pictures on my office wall or put-
ting them on my desk.... I am no less a captive at work than other
workers who may enter my office and be offended. 38
Finally, speech may not be suppressed simply because it conveys
ideas inconsistent with gender equality. Such expression does not nec-
essarily undermine gender equality. For example, speeches arguing
that women should be second-class citizens might persuade some who
hear them or hear about them, but they may well galvanize greater
numbers to oppose those views, and to work against them. Even as-
suming that some sexist speech might have a net adverse impact on
gender equality-for example, by instilling negative attitudes toward
women and women's rights-that would not justify suppressing it.
Under the Supreme Court's precedents, even speech advocating gen-
der discrimination or violence against women should be protected un-
as (1) the size of the ... area involved, (2) the duration [or] frequency with which an
individual is in the area ... or (3) the extent to which alternatives exist so that the
individual can reasonably be called upon to avoid the area .... Assaultive sensory
intrusions are those that are objectionable to the average person because of an exces-
sive degree of intensity, e.g., volume or brightness, and which cannot be avoided.
ACLU POLICY GUIDE, supra note 3, at Policy No. 43 (emphasis added).
37. But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) dictum: "[Wlords can in
some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against conduct .... [F]or
example, sexually derogatory 'fighting words,' among other words, may produce a violation of
Title VII's general prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment practices."
This dictum has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Steele, Fighting the Devil with a
Double-Edged Sword: Is the Speech-Invoked Hostile Work Environment Hostile to O'Brien?, 72
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 83, 90 n.36, 120 n.199, 139 (1994). Steele argues that "the dictum in
R.A.V. should not be interpreted to support the constitutionality of... the use of disfavored
speech in finding a hostile work environment .... [T]he analysis of the case itself make[s] a
speech-invoked hostile work environment appear to be an unconstitutional governmental regu-
lation of viewpoints." Id. at 139; see also Keith R. Fentonmiller, Verbal Sexual Harrassment as
Equality-Depriving Conduct, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 565, 604 (1994); James H. Fowles, III, Note,
Hostile Environment and the First Amendment: What Now After Harris and St. Paul?, 46 S.C. L.
REv. 471, 497 (1995) ("If the conduct consists primarily of speech and the speech expresses a
viewpoint, the hostile environment theory does not sweep up anything except the speech itself-
and, perhaps, the First Amendment as well.").
38. GREENAWALT, supra note 14, at 86 (emphasis in original).
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less it constitutes intentional incitement to imminent illegal
discrimination or violence.
39
For the foregoing reasons, some sexist expression in the work-
place may not be prohibited or punished as sexual harassment. In
short, equality rights should not automatically and mechanically
trump free speech rights any more than-as I previously noted-free
speech rights should automatically and mechanically trump equality
rights.
IV. THE CHALLENGE OF CHARACTERIZING PARTICULAR
WORKPLACE EXPRESSION: DISTINGUISHING PROTECTED FREE
SPEECH FROM DISCRIMINATORY HARASSMENT
So far I have reached the following conclusions: First, that some
sexist workplace expression constitutes proscribable harassment; but,
second, that some sexist workplace expression constitutes protected
free speech. How do we draw the line between these two categories
of workplace expression? How do we distinguish between expression
that is harassing and must be suppressed to honor gender equality
rights, and expression that is merely offensive and must be protected
in order to honor free speech rights?
For individuals and organizations primarily concerned with one
of the two rights at stake-either gender equality or free speech-it is
relatively simple to draw this line because they maintain that one right
automatically trumps the other. Therefore, those of us who try to
draw a line somewhere in the middle so as to respect both rights have
been attacked from both directions. For example, the ACLU's posi-
tion has been attacked by both Wayne State Law School Professor
Kingsley Browne, who says we overprotect equality at the expense of
free speech, 40 and University of Southern California Law Professor
Judith Resnik, who says we overprotect free speech at the expense of
equality. 41 Such diametrically opposed criticisms give me some com-
fort that we may well have struck the balance just about right!
39. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
40. Kingsley R. Browne, Stifling Sexually Hostile Speech: To What Extent Does the First
Amendment Limit the Reach of Sexual Harassment Law When the Hostile Environment is Cre-
ated by Speech?, CoN. L. TRIB., Nov. 29, 1993, at 19 ("Notwithstanding this viewpoint-based
restriction on speech [through sexual harassment rules], organizations such as the American
Civil Liberties Union have shown an uncharacteristic lack of concern about the First Amend-
ment, being satisfied to balance free-speech rights against their perceptions of workplace equal-
ity. Workplace equality usually wins.").
41. Oral statements by Judith Resnik to author at a conference held on October 16, 1993
and co-sponsored by N.Y.U. School of Law's Hays Civil Liberties Program and the Fund for
Free Expression entitled Free Speech and Equality; Do We Have to Choose? and at the National
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At one extreme, some free speech absolutists, such as Browne,
have essentially argued that the entire concept of hostile environment
sexual harassment is inherently unconstitutional, at least when it is
based on expression rather than unwanted physical contact.42 A simi-
lar position has been espoused by Jeff Rosen, the Legal Affairs Editor
of The New Republic. He declared: "[T]he most serious threat to the
First Amendment of the past decade [is] the notion that words that
create an 'intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment,'
without inflicting more tangible harms, can be punished as
harassment.
' '43
A. Supreme Court's Ruling in Harris v. Forklift Systems
The Supreme Court expressly rejected this free speech absolutist
position in Harris v. Forklift Systems.44 There, the Court unanimously
overruled the Sixth Circuit, which had demanded proof of psychologi-
cal injury in order to show hostile environment sexual harassment.
45
And rightly so. No such prerequisite is imposed on victims of other
kinds of employment discrimination-for good reasons, as explained
by legal journalist Stuart Taylor, Jr.:
Requiring proof of psychological injury would deny a remedy to any
victim tough enough to keep her emotional composure while her
status at work was being degraded by the most repugnant sexual
harassment. It would force some victims to endure (while tempting
others to feign) mental breakdowns to get relief. It would also be
bad for employers, by allowing to fester (while damages snowball)
grievances that the law should seek to nip in the bud. And it would
convert harassment trials into costly and unhelpful swearing con-
tests between psychiatric experts.
46
Association of Women Judges Annual Conference, Scotsdale, Arizona, Oct. 2, 1994; see also
Marion Crain, Between Feminism and Unionisn Working Class Women, Sex Equality, and La-
bor Speech, 82 Geo L.J. 1903 (1994). Crain argues that "[t]he First Amendment has proved to be
of far more service to the dominant group than to outsiders," id. at 1993, and concludes "free
speech values must yield to equality values." Id. at 1996.
42. Browne I, supra note 2, at 544 (hostile environment harassment liability should be
based only on "unwanted sexual touching"). Professor Eugene Volokh, who has also criticized
the current concept of hostile environment sexual harassment as insufficiently protective of free
speech, has characterized Browne's position as "extreme." Volokh II, supra note 2, at 1797. In
contrast with Browne, Volokh would sanction hostile environment sexual harassment claims
based on expression, but only when the expression is consciously directed at a particular person
whom the speaker knows does not welcome it. Id. at 1843-68.
43. Jeff Rosen, Court Watch: Reasonable Women, THE NEW REPUBic, Nov. 1, 1993, at 12.
44. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
45. Id. at 370.
46. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Sexual Harassment: Where's the Line?, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 18, 1993, at
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Indeed, even the lawyers for the Harris defendant rejected the psy-
chological-injury test as did all of the many amici curiae.
47
In Harris, the Supreme Court also rejected the position at the
opposite extreme of the spectrum, asserted by those who exalt gender
equality over free speech: that any workplace conduct that an em-
ployee finds "offensive" should be deemed illegal sexual harassment.
This position was advocated, for example, in an amicus brief filed by
what Stuart Taylor called "speech-police feminists, '48 including Uni-
versity of Michigan Law Professor Catharine MacKinnon and the
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund. The brief suggested that
"a woman has a sexual harassment claim any time she subjectively
feels that her working environment is 'offensive' because of the gen-
der-based comments made by a male co-worker, '49 no matter how
unreasonable that feeling might be. The brief declared that "[t]he rea-
sonableness of any particular plaintiff's reaction ... is irrelevant.
'50
The Harris Court did not focus specifically on tensions between
free speech and gender equity because that issue was not directly
presented. Even apart from free speech concerns, the Court ruled
that an employee's subjective view that conduct is offensive is not
enough to deem such conduct hostile environment harassment under
Title VII or the EEOC guidelines.5' When also taking free speech
concerns into account, they provide an additional basis for rejecting
the subjective-offense standard. Any such standard would greatly
chill the expression of all employees, and force employers to act as
speech police.
As just noted, the Harris decision did not expressly focus on
drawing the line between harassing and protected expression at work;
rather, it staked out the broad bounds within which that line must be
drawn. Beyond rejecting the two extreme positions-either that sex-
ual harassment exists anytime an employee is offended, or that it
never exists unless an employee has suffered tangible psychological
harm-the Court provided scant additional guidance. It said only
that, to constitute hostile environment harassment, conduct has to be
"severe or pervasive enough" that it would be perceived as abusive or
47. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Sexual Harassment Drawing the Line in Shifting Sands, CONN. L.
TRIB., Oct. 25, 1993, at 18.
48. Id.
49. Id. (referring to amicus brief filed by NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and
Catharine A. MacKinnon).
50. Id. (quoting amicus brief filed by NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and Catha-
rine A. MacKinnon).
51. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
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hostile by both a hypothetical "reasonable person" and the actually
affected employee. 52
The Court acknowledged that this standard is imprecise, and em-
phasized the necessarily fact-bound nature of the determination in any
particular case:
[W]hether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" can be deter-
mined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include
the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it
is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utter-
ance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's
work performance .... [W]hile psychological harm, like any other
relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is
required.
53
Justice Scalia commented in his separate concurring opinion that
the Court's unclear standard "[a]s a practical matter ... lets virtually
unguided juries decide whether sex-related conduct" in the workplace
constitutes prohibited sexual harassment. He confessed, however,
that he was unable to formulate an alternative, more precise, stan-
dard. Accordingly, he endorsed the open-ended, contextual approach
laid out in the majority opinion. 54
I also believe that whether conduct is sexually harassing must be
determined on a case-by-case basis. Consistent with this approach,
Justice Ginsburg suggested a helpful benchmark of hostile environ-
ment harassment: "The critical issue . . . is whether members of one
sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employ-
ment to which members of the other sex are not exposed. ' 55
As the Supreme Court Justices have concluded, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to formulate a precise legal definition of sexual harass-
ment. This difficulty is compounded when the alleged harassing be-
52. Id. at 371.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 372 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). But see Browne, supra note 40, at 19:
During oral argument in the Harris case, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg unwittingly
demonstrated the substantial difficulty of crafting a rule that comports with First
Amendment standards. Among the plaintiff's complaints was that her boss had said to
her, "You're a woman, what do you know?" In discussing hypotheticals involving the
relevance of similar comments being directed toward men, Ginsburg asserted, "'You're
a woman, what do you know?' means something different than 'you're a man, what do
you know?"' Possibly it does, although if Ginsburg dismissed a male clerk's observa-
tions about the Harris case by saying "You're a man, what do you know?" the clerk
might be just as offended as Harris was by her boss's comment.
In any event, even if Justice Ginsburg is correct, how on earth are employers to
make such delicate linguistic judgments in advance? The answer is that they cannot,
and the rational employer wishing to avoid liability will therefore prohibit both
statements.
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havior consists of expression that would be entitled to First
Amendment protection in other contexts. Neither of the Supreme
Court's two opinions concerning sexual harassment 56 expressly dis-
cussed this First Amendment issue, since it was not germane to either.
But extrapolating from those cases, as well as from recent free speech
rulings, it is clear that protected expression can be distinguished from
proscribable harassment only on a contextual basis, turning on the
facts and circumstances of each particular case.57
B. Building on Harris: Specifying Factors that are Relevant and
Irrelevant, Dispositive and Non-Dispositive
I think the best one can do is to continue the process that the
Supreme Court began in Harris by both specifying factors that should
be relevant and specifying factors that should be irrelevant, or at least
non-dispositive.5 8 This is precisely what the ACLU has done-to the
apparent frustration of many journalists. Whenever a reporter asks
me, "Does the ACLU believe-or do you believe-that expression at
work should be treated as sexual harassment or protected free
speech?," I am constrained to answer, "It depends. ' '59
The ACLU policy concerning hostile environment harassment-
which, like the Supreme Court's definition in Harris, turns on an as-
sessment of the facts and circumstances in any particular case-reads
as follows:
The ACLU supports the right of all persons to enjoy equal em-
ployment free from discrimination on the basis of sex or sexual ori-
entation. One form discrimination takes is sexual harassment.
Sexual harassment is a historic mode of discrimination against wo-
men, but its victims may be male or female, heterosexual or homo-
sexual depending on the distribution of power in the workplace and
the status of victims and perpetrators. Sexual harassment is made
possible by power imbalances; victims of harassment are generally
in a minority in the workplace or in positions of relative powerless-
ness. Conduct or expression that might not be actionable outside
the workplace may constitute harassment in the workplace precisely
because of its hierarchical nature-employers and employees, su-
56. Harris, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) and Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 56 (1986).
57. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2524-30 (1994).
58. While the Harris Court held that proof of a tangible psychological injury was not neces-
sary for showing sexual harassment-in other words, that the absence of such proof did not
foreclose a harassment claim-it also held that proof of a psychological injury was a relevant
factor, which the factfinder could weigh in favor of finding that sexual harassment had occurred.
Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
59. See, e.g., Kimberly Blanton, Free Speech: New Defense In Cases of Harassment, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 7, 1994, at 24.
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pervisors and subordinates do not interact as equals-and because
most people have to work to live.
Sexual harassment exists in any of the following situations:
6) Where conduct or expression is severe or pervasive enough
to create unequal working conditions based on sex or sexual orien-
tation by, among other things, significantly hindering a reasonable
employee in performing his or her job because of the employee's
sex or sexual orientation, or significantly harming the employee's
physical, mental or emotional well-being because of the employee's
sex or sexual orientation. Conduct or expression that meets this
definition is actionable because of the unique characteristics of the
workplace-including the existence of authority relationships, the
economic necessity to remain, and the limited opportunity to re-
spond-even though it might not be actionable in other settings.
Sexual harassment may be actionable even if it was not directed at
any particular employee. Sexually explicit literature, graphic dis-
plays or speech may constitute harassment under this policy, but
they do not constitute harassment per se.
60
C. Advantages and Disadvantages of a Moderate, Fact-Specific
Approach
I recognize that a fact-specific, contextual approach of the sort
that the foregoing policy lays out does not give precise guidance to
employers or employees as to exactly what expression should be off-
limits. Therefore, it creates the danger that employers will err in favor
of overly restrictive rules to avoid Title VII liability, and that employ-
ees will engage in self-censorship to avoid being labeled as sexual
harassers.
However, I do not see an alternative. Unlike Kingsley Browne, I
do not think the free speech threats posed by hostile environment sex-
ual harassment regulations-troubling as they are-should always
trump every employee's right to be free from (non-quid-pro-quo) ver-
bal abuse in all cases. As Stuart Taylor wrote in defense of a "middle
ground" position, rejecting not only the extreme positions of "speech-
police feminists" (Taylor's phrase), but also the extreme positions of
Browne and other "speech-centered non-feminists" 61 (my coinage, as
a counterpart to Taylor's):
60. ACLU PoLIcy GUIDE, supra note 3, at Policy No. 316.
61. As Taylor stated:
[Browne] questions whether any standard sufficiently clear to pass First Amendment
muster can be devised that would impose liability for gender-based (or race-based)
harassment in the form of verbal abuse or symbolic expression .. .no matter how
severe the vilification, no matter how injurious the intent of the harasser or the effect
on the target, and no matter how much power the harasser has over the target.
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I think the key is to distinguish generalized statements of opinion-
which should enjoy absolute protection no matter how sexist-from
gender-based verbal abuse that (1) is targeted on a particular em-
ployee, and so extreme that (2) the target reasonably feels dimin-
ished in her status or effectiveness at work, and that (3) amounts to
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. This last (new)
component, which imports a familiar common-law concept, is
designed to draw a reasonably intelligible line (for employers and
courts alike) between free speech and impermissible personal har-
assment, without requiring anything so clinical as the "psychological
injury" standard that the Supreme Court properly rejected in
Harris.
62
Certainly Browne and others-including myself 63-have pointed
to particular cases where sexual harassment regulations have been
abused to suppress workplace expression that should be protected. 64
But these abuses do not disprove the basic concept at issue: that some
workplace expression violates a woman's right to equal employment
opportunities. 65 There have been abuses in the other direction, too,
where courts refused to find hostile environment harassment despite
severe, pervasive, harassing speech, directed at female employees,
which these employees reasonably perceived as hostile and abusive.66
These abuses also should not disprove the other basic concept at issue:
that some workplace expression should be constitutionally protected.
Stuart Taylor, Jr. responding in Browne, supra note 40, at 19.
62. Id.
63. See STROSSEN, supra note 9, at 121-22; 126-30, 133-35.
64. See cases cited by Browne I, supra note 2 at 483; Volokh II, supra note 2, at 1794 nn.7 &
8. 1 do not necessarily agree with the authors' descriptions of the dispositive facts in these cases.
But, assuming arguendo that they are accurately described, at least some of them would raise
troubling concerns about the overenforcement of prohibitions on sexual harassment, at the ex-
pense of free speech in the workplace.
65. No less staunch a defender of free speech than Columbia University Law School Profes-
sor Kent Greenawalt made this point in the following forceful terms: "Were all workplace
speech held irrelevant to harassment, men could make working conditions extremely hostile for
women, and drive many of them from their jobs. If women are to be treated equally in the
workplace environment, restricting harassing language is very important." GREENAWALT, supra
note 14, at 80.
66. See Deborah Epstein, Can A 'Dumb Ass Woman' Achieve Equality in the Workplace?
Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEo. L.J. 399 (1996). Profes-
sor Epstein cites numerous cases in which harassing workplace speech was held insufficiently
severe or pervasive to constitute hostile environment sexual harassment. Id. at 413 n.88, 416-17
nn.104-11. Professor Epstein also cites additional cases in which courts have refused to impose
liability for hostile environment sexual harassment based on an "extremely narrow definition of
the welcomeness requirement." Id. at 414 n.92. I do not necessarily agree with Professor Ep-
stein's descriptions of the dispositive facts in all of these cases. But, assuming arguendo that they
are accurately described, at least some of them would raise troubling concerns about the under-




There may well be disagreement over details even among those
who are generally committed to what I consider a "moderate" posi-
tion-i.e., one that neither automatically prohibits hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claims that are based (in whole or in part) on
expression, nor automatically upholds such claims whenever the plain-
tiff employee was offended by workplace expression. Because such a
moderate position requires an evaluation of various factors in any par-
ticular case, its supporters may well disagree as to whether any partic-
ular factor should be determinative, relevant, or irrelevant.
D. One Debatable Factor: Should Expression that is not Directed
at the Complaining Employee be Considered in a Hostile
Environment Harassment Claim?
One factor that has triggered much debate is the directed or non-
directed nature of the allegedly harassing expression. If workplace
expression is deliberately aimed at a particular employee with the in-
tent of creating a hostile or abusive working environment for her,
surely that is a factor that should weigh in favor of finding hostile
environment harassment; the direct targeting of the allegedly harass-
ing expression is certainly a relevant factor. But is it, as some contend,
a dispositive factor? More precisely, is the direct or intentional target-
ing of expression toward the complaining employee a prerequisite for
a hostile environment harassment claim based on expression?
Jeffrey Rosen,67 Stuart Taylor,68 and Eugene Volokh69 all have
urged that absent direct targeting, expression should not be consid-
ered in a hostile environment harassment claim. Within the ACLU,
that position previously was reflected in our sexual harassment policy,
although the current policy, quoted above, 70 does not require direct
targeting. During the debates that culminated in the current policy,
the direct targeting issue was a major focus of discussion.71
67. See Rosen, supra note 43, at 12.
68. See Taylor, supra note 46, at 25.
69. See Volokh II, supra note 2, at 1846.
70. See supra text accompanying note 60.
71. One committee report proposed reinstating a direct targeting requirement when the
alleged harassment consists solely or primarily of expression, explaining:
To balance free speech, privacy and equality interests in the workplace, we have estab-
lished a two tiered standard of review for sexual harassment cases involving speech and
conduct. When the alleged harassment does not consist primarily or solely of speech,
we are proposing something akin to a disparate impact test: Sexual conduct that cre-
ates differential working conditions and has a demonstrable effect on job performance
or opportunities is actionable regardless of its intent. Sexual speech is actionable only
when it is intended to harass the particular person or group against whom it is directed.
Intent may be inferred, however, and directedness may be covert. For example, some-
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V. ONE NON-DIsposrrIVE FACTOR: NOT ALL SEXUAL
EXPRESSION AT WORK IS SEXUAL HARASSMENT
In the remainder of this Article, I would like to focus on one
factor that should not be dispositive in defining sexually harassing ex-
pression: the sexual content of the expression. Unfortunately, this fac-
tor has been given great and even conclusive weight in too many
workplace rules and in some judicial decisions. An entire chapter in
my 1995 book, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND
THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS, discusses this subject. It is entitled
Defining Sexual Harassment: Sexuality Does Not Equal Sexism. I will
only summarize that analysis here.
The problem begins with the EEOC's definition of "hostile envi-
ronment" harassment, which targets conduct that is sexual rather than
sexist. The EEOC guidelines, issued in 1980, define hostile environ-
ment harassment as "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature...
when... such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably inter-
fering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidat-
ing, hostile, or offensive working environment. '72
Since Title VII's goal, appropriately, is to protect women from
gender-based discrimination, its focus on conduct "of a sexual nature"
is misplaced. That focus is both underinclusive and overinclusive. It is
underinclusive insofar as it does not encompass nonsexual conduct
that is gender discriminatory. It is overinclusive insofar as it does en-
compass sexual conduct that is not gender discriminatory.
In a policy statement issued in 1990, the EEOC declared that,
notwithstanding the 1980 guidelines' focus on sexual conduct or ex-
pression, sex-based harassment could also be accomplished through
one who persists in making sexually explicit remarks after being asked to stop or after a
clear indication that the remarks are unwelcome may intend to harass the person or
persons ... within whose hearing the remarks are persistently made. But arguably
intimidating or exclusionary remarks that are not meant to be overheard could not
constitute harassment.
Majority Report (ACLU/Special Committee on Sexual Harassment), Apr. 1995, at 4-3.
Another committee report opposed the direct targeting requirement, explaining:
Victims of sexual harassment ... should not be required to prove that speech or con-
duct was specifically directed at them. If the workplace is so pervasively sexist-if sex-
ual harassment is so widespread, broadly aimed, or effective-that nothing need be
directed at any particular women... workers to destroy workplace equality, drive some
or all of them off the job, hinder their job performance, or produce physical or psycho-
logical harm, then the violation is worse than if only a few persons are targeted for
unequal mistreatment based on sex.
Minority Report (ACLU/Special Committee on Sexual Harassment), Apr. 14, 1995, at 10-11
(emphasis in original).
72. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1992) (emphasis added).
1995]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
nonsexual conduct or expression.73 Accordingly, in 1993 the EEOC
decided to "put in guideline form the rule that sex harassment is not
limited to harassment that is sexual in nature, but also includes harass-
ment due to gender-based animus. ' '74 This effort, however, was un-
successful. The EEOC withdrew the proposed new guidelines in
response to much criticism that they violated First Amendment rights,
and offered scant guidance on how to determine when non-sexual ex-
pression and conduct constitutes sex harassment.75 Reflecting the fail-
ure of the EEOC guidelines to explicitly extend to nonsexual conduct
and expression, many-although not a1176-federal courts have failed
to recognize that sexual harassment in violation of Title VII may con-
sist of nonsexual behavior.77
73. See EEOC Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, reprinted in 60
DAILY LAB. REP., Mar. 28, 1990, at E-1, E-5:
Although the Guidelines specifically address conduct that is sexual in nature, the Com-
mission notes that sex-based harassment-that is, harassment not involving sexual ac-
tivity or language-may also give rise to Title VII liability (just as in the case of
harassment based on race, national origin or religion) if it is "sufficiently patterned or
pervasive" and directed at employees because of their sex.
Id.
74. 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 (1993).
75. The proposed guidelines stated that harassing conduct includes, but is not limited to:
(i) epithets, slurs, negative stereotyping, or threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts
that relate to race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability; and
(ii) written or graphic material that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion toward an
individual or group because of race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age or disa-
bility and that is placed on walls, bulletin boards, or elsewhere on the employer's prem-
ises, or circulated in the workplace.
Id. at 268.
76. Courts of Appeals have held that predicate acts underlying a sexual harassment claim
need not be clearly sexual in nature. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th
Cir., 1987) (threats of physical and sexual violence and incidents of verbal abuse, in which the
defendant called the plaintiff "Buffalo Butt," as well as uttered racial and ethnic slurs at her and
in her presence, were properly considered in support of plaintiff's sexual harassment claim);
McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (acts of physical aggression were prop-
erly considered in support of plaintiff's sexual harassment claim); see also Hall v. Gus Construc-
tion Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) ("While the definition of sexual harassment in
the EEOC regulation emphasizes explicitly sexual behavior, the regulations do not state that
other types of harassment should not be considered.... Intimidation and hostility toward wo-
men because they are women can obviously result from conduct other than sexual advances.");
Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922, 929 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (finding liability
where comments and behavior were not overtly sexual, but were derogatory and insulting to
women generally and demeaning to the plaintiff personally); Laughinghouse v. Risser, 754 F.
Supp. 836, 840 (D. Kan. 1990) (denying summary judgment for defendant where most of the
comments were not sexual in nature).
77. See, e.g., DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d.591, 596 (5th Cir.
1995) (citing nonsexualized nature of comments disparaging women's competence as police of-
ficers in rejecting sexual harassment claim by female police sergeant); Cram v. Lamson & Ses-
sions Co., 49 F.3d 466, 474 (8th Cir. 1995) (concluding that defendant's "interactions with
[Plaintiff] ... were brief, sporadic, nonsexual, "nonthreatening, and polite," thereby not making
out claim of hostile working environment); EEOC v. A. Sam & Sons Produce Co., 872 F. Supp.
29, 35, 40 (W.D.N.Y. 1994)(concluding that female employee who was called a "whore" could
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Consistent with the EEOC guidelines' explicit focus on sexual
conduct and expression-and the parallel focus of several courts-
many workplace definitions of sexual harassment replicate the same
misplaced focus. That focus is certainly consistent with the views of
University of Michigan Law School Professor Catharine MacKinnon,
who played a key role in formulating the concept of sexual harass-
ment; she has repeatedly asserted that her concern is sexual conduct
or expression, and not nonsexual, but sexist, conduct or expression.78
The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the sexual nature
of conduct or expression may make it, ipso facto, sexually harassing.
But any such definition is plainly at odds with the Harris Court's con-
textual approach to hostile environment sexual harassment, which
stresses the importance of all the facts and circumstances in any par-
ticular situation.79 Thus, consistent with the Court's rationale, any
conduct or expression must be evaluated in its overall setting, and
cannot be deemed illegal harassment merely because of its content
without regard to its context.
Notwithstanding the Harris decision, too many workplace rules
treat sexually oriented expression in an acontextual fashion, conclud-
ing that such expression automatically constitutes sexual harassment
no matter what the surrounding facts and circumstances. 80 Worse yet,
some lower courts have endorsed this approach.
Sexual expression, along with all other expression or conduct,
may constitute sexual harassment, if, but only if, it is used in a certain
way. This point is made by a case that was recently settled while it
was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
recover for sexual harassment but that second female employee who was not directly called a
"whore" could not).
78. See, e.g, CATIHARINE A. MAcKINNON, ONLY WORDS 56-57 (1993):
For expressive purposes, the distinction that matters, in my view, is not between harass-
ment based on race and harassment based on gender, which are often inseparable in
any case, but between speech that is sex and speech that is not. Harassment that is
sexual is a sex act, like pornography. Harassment that is not sexual works more
through its content .... By harassment that is not explicitly sexual, I mean teachers'
saying that women students are no good at this subject or calling on only men.
See also id. at 61-62; CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKiNO WOMEN:
A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Introduction, 10 CAP. U. L.
REV. i (1981).
79. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
80. For example, in 1992 the Los Angeles County Fire Department issued a sweeping sexual
harassment policy that banned all "sexually-oriented magazines, particularly those containing
nude pictures ... posters or calendars which display nudity or are overtly sexual, [and] ... [a]ll
other material ... of a clear sexual connotation" from the entire workplace, including dormito-
ries, restrooms, and lockers. Amicus Brief for Feminists for Free Expression at 5, Johnson v.
County of L.A. Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (quoting Los Angeles County Fire
Department policy on sexual harassment).
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Circuit, Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards.81 In that case, male co-
workers had forced sexually explicit photographs upon a female
welder, Lois Robinson, in ways that made it more difficult for her to
work, with apparent gender-discriminatory intent. For example, a pic-
ture of a nude woman, with her knees drawn up to her chest and ex-
posing her genitals, was left on a toolbox where Robinson had to
return her tools. Several male coworkers were present when she did
so and laughed at her when she became visibly upset by the picture.82
Similarly, another male coworker waved around a picture of a nude
woman with long blond hair holding a whip, in an enclosed area where
he and Robinson were working with about five other men. Robinson
felt particularly targeted by this action, because she has long blond
hair and worked with a welding tool known as a "whip. '83
This type of conduct was appropriately deemed sexual harass-
ment. But Robinson's federal court complaint, as well as the trial
judge's order, went much further. Robinson sought, and the judge
issued, a total ban on all "sexually suggestive" pictures, regardless of
how they were used.84 Thus, the court banished from the workplace
not only the sexually oriented images that some employees used to
harass Robinson, but also sexually oriented images that employees
used for their own private enjoyment, and that interfered with neither
their own work nor that of any coworkers.
Under the court's sweeping order, no employees could bring any
sexually suggestive pictures to work, even if they kept the pictures in
their own lockers, or discreetly looked at them during their lunch
breaks, without showing them to any other employees. The judge's
expansive definition of proscribed images included any picture of a
woman "who is not fully clothed or in clothes that are not suited to ...
routine work in and around the shipyard and who is posed for the
obvious purpose of ... drawing attention to private portions of.. . her
body. 8 5
In 1992, the ACLU filed an amicus appellate brief in the Robin-
son case protesting the trial judge's overbroad purge of sexually ori-
81. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991), cross appeals dismissed per stipulation (1995). Ac-
cording to Deborah A. Ellis, Legal Director of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund,
which represented the plaintiff, "[t]he settlement agreement provides for damages and attorneys
fees of an undisclosed amount, leaves intact the injunctive relief obtained from the federal trial
court, and dismisses all pending appeals." Letter from Deborah A. Ellis to Terisa E. Chaw (Apr.
14, 1995) (on file with the author).
82. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1497.
83. Id. at 1496.
84. Id. at 1540, 1542-43.
85. Id. at 1542-43.
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ented expression. Our brief noted that his prohibition could well
encompass fashion magazines, family photographs, and classic works
of art.86 Defenders of the Robinson order pooh-poohed these fears as
speculative. But they proved sadly prophetic in 1993, when officials of
the University of Nebraska invoked their sexual harassment policy to
order a teaching assistant to remove a photograph of his wife in a
bathing suit from his office.8
7
A growing number of sexual harassment rules overbroadly bar
sexual expression from workplaces, even when such expression is not
targeted at, or even seen by, any objecting female employees. For
example, in 1992 the Los Angeles County Fire Department issued a
sweeping sexual harassment policy that banned "[a]ll ... material...
of a clear sexual connotation" from the entire workplace, including
dormitories, restrooms, and lockers. 88 Not only were firefighters for-
bidden to read these materials; they could not even bring them to the
firehouse.
Such total bans on sexual speech are especially onerous for
firefighters, who often spend several days in a row at their stations
serving round-the-clock shifts. To forbid firefighters from looking at
certain materials there, even when they are on personal time and in
their private quarters, is tantamount to prohibiting them from en-
joying these materials alone in the privacy of their homes.8 9 Accord-
ingly, the ACLU challenged the Los Angeles County Fire
Department's sweeping restraints as violating the firefighters' rights of
free speech and privacy. In 1994, we won that case in the trial court,90
and Los Angeles officials subsequently adopted a policy acceptable to
Johnson and the ACLU.91
86. Amicus Brief of ACLU at 21, Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp.
1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
87. David Moshman, Banned at UN-L, ACADEMIC FREEDOM COALITION OF NEBRASKA
NEWSLETTER, at 4(2):2.
88. Los Angeles County Fire Department General Operations Manual, ch. 4, Subj. 20, at 3
(July 15, 1992) (quoted in Amicus Brief for Feminists for Free Expression at 5, Johnson v.
County of L.A. Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1994)).
89. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("If the First Amendment means
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what
books he may read or what films he may watch.").
90. Johnson v. County of L.A. Fire Dep't, No. 93-7589, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8270 (C.D.
Cal. June 10, 1994, amended Oct. 18, 1994) (holding that the policy was unconstitutional as ap-
plied to the quiet reading and possession of sexually oriented materials during a firefighter's
personal time).
91. See Los Angeles County Fire Department General Operations Manual, ch. 4, subj. 20,
at 3 (Sept. 15, 1994). While the revised policy prohibits "[d]isplaying nude photographs, includ-
ing those contained in magazines, posters, calendars or other publications," it provides that
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Beyond rules that sweepingly ban sexual expression from the
workplace, an emerging, even more capacious, concept of sexual har-
assment would bar sexual expression from members of the general
public. It has been claimed that stores that sell sexually oriented
magazines such as Playboy, Penthouse, and Playgirl are committing
sexual harassment against their female employees and customers.
Such claims have been leveled at various businesses, including con-
venience stores and campus bookstores.
This overly expansive, distorted concept of workplace sexual har-
assment has even engendered efforts to ban sexually oriented expres-
sion from public accommodations. 92 For example, in 1991 a waitress
at Bette's Oceanview Diner in Berkeley, California refused to serve a
journalist who was reading an article in Playboy magazine on the
ground that this constituted sexual harassment and hence violated Ti-
tle VII.93 Suppose a customer had been reading a newsletter from the
National Organization for Women or from Planned Parenthood, and
the waitress was a Catholic or Evangelical Protestant who believed
that abortion is murder. Should she be permitted to refuse to serve
the customer on the ground that this reading material constitutes reli-
gious harassment, thus violating Title VII's prohibition on religious
discrimination in employment? 94
The Bette's Oceanview Diner scenario raises an additional reason
for protecting expression in workplaces, beyond concern for employee
free speech rights: one person's workplace is another's public accom-
modation. In the case of streets, sidewalks, and parks, one person's
workplace is for others what the Supreme Court has called a tradi-
tional public forum, where speech should be especially free.95 This
problem was explained in a brief by Feminists for Free Expression, a
New York-based national organization, in the Los Angeles firefighters
case:
[E]very conceivable location constitutes the workplace for some
group of workers.... [E]ven the[ ] quintessential public fora [e.g.
streets and parks] are workplaces for maintenance crews, garbage
collectors, postal carriers, and an endless array of other employees.
These workers surely have an equal claim to protection from a 'hos-
"[s]uch materials may be viewed privately and quietly" and that "[t]hey may be viewed in the
lounge areas, dorm areas or restrooms, or other areas as approved by the Battalion Chief." Id.
92. See generally STROSSEN, supra note 9, at 133-37.
93. See James R. Petersen, The Playboy Read-in, PLAYBOY, Feb. 1992, at 37-39.
94. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982) (prohibiting discrimination and
segregation in places of public accommodation on the basis of race, color, religion, or national
origin).
95. See TRIBE, supra note 15, at 964-65, 986-87.
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tile work environment.' ... [W]e cannot afford to exclude so perva-
sive a realm of life as the workplace from First Amendment
protection, without rendering free speech a nullity.
96
These warnings are realistic. As journalist Mark Schapiro re-
ported in 1994: "In more than a dozen recent cases, allegations of sex-
ual harassment have been used to force removal of artwork from
classrooms, municipal buildings, and public art galleries. ' 97 To add
insult to injury, some of these incidents have involved works by fe-
male artists and with feminist themes. One victim of this miscon-
ceived notion of sexual harassment was Brazilian artist Zoravia
Bettiol. In 1993, the Menlo Park, California City Hall presented an
exhibit of Bettiol's woodcuts that featured Greek gods and goddesses
and scenes from Romeo and Juliet. City officials abruptly terminated
the exhibit a few weeks after it opened in response to a female
worker's complaint that the nude bodies portrayed in some of these
works were sexually harassing.98
It is ironic that in the name of protecting women against sexual
harassment, women and feminists are being adversely affected, and
this irony has reverberations beyond the Bettiol incident, alas. In
some important respects workplace harassment regulations present no
tension between gender equality and free expression, although the ti-
tle of the Piper Lecture implies otherwise ("The Tensions Between
Regulating Workplace Harassment and the First Amendment").
Rather, harassment regulations that falsely equate sexual expression
with sexist harassment threaten both women's equality and free
speech.
Let me briefly sketch three reasons for this conclusion. First,
when women or employers cry "sexual harassment!" at any passing
reference to sex, they trivialize the issue, make it a laughingstock, and
deflect attention and resources from the serious ongoing problems of
gender discrimination in the workplace, including the many legitimate
claims of hostile environment harassment.
Second, women's equality is undermined by the presumption that
the mere presence of sexual expression in the workplace is harassing;
this presumption resurrects the very traditional and very disempower-
ing notion that sex and sexual expression are intrinsically demeaning
96. Amicus Brief of Feminists for Free Expression at 6-7, Johnson v. County of L.A. Fire
Dep't., 865 F. Supp. 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (emphasis in original).
97. Mark Schapiro, The Fine Art of Sexual Harassment: Aphrodite Gets Her Day in Court,
HARPER'S, July 1994, at 62-63.
98. See Hillary the Stupendous, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), Apr. 10, 1993, at B2 (Editorial).
19951
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
to women. It is especially ironic that the same desire to protect wo-
men from sexual language that is now said to advance women's em-
ployment opportunities was previously used to bar women from many
such opportunities, including in my own profession-the law: Histori-
cally, judges justified upholding state laws that barred women from
practicing law or serving on juries by citing the need to "protect" wo-
men from vulgar or sexual language.99
As recently as 1949, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected a chal-
lenge to a statute that allowed women to serve on juries only if they
specifically volunteered on this very ground. The court "reasoned" as
follows: "Criminal court trials often involve testimony of the foulest
kind, and . . . the use of filthy and loathsome words, references to
intimate sex relationships, and other elements that would prove ...
degrading to a lady." 100 As we all know from the O.J. Simpson trial,
that description is factually accurate! But it does not constitute a le-
gally persuasive reason for excluding women from the workplace.
Nor should it now be resurrected to exclude certain language from the
workplace out of the same misplaced concern for protecting women. I
agree with Professor Kingsley Browne, when he wrote: "The assump-
tion that women as a group may be more offended by profanity than
men as a group seems like just the sort of stereotype that Title VII was
intended to erase." 101
Third, the false equation between sexual expression and sexual
harassment subverts women's rights in the workplace: by making it
harder for women to get jobs and to succeed in them. This is particu-
larly true in occupations that depend heavily on mentor relationships.
For example, many female associates at law firms believe that, be-
cause firms fear potential harassment charges, they are being denied
travel, social, and other opportunities for informal interaction with
male partners and clients that would help them rise in their firms.
10 2
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I believe it is possible to develop and apply princi-
ples for regulating sexually harassing workplace expression that are
faithful to both free speech and equality rights. No doubt, occasional
cases will arise where it will be so difficult to draw the line between
99. See, e.g., Bailey v. State, 219 S.W.2d 424 (Ark. 1949).
100. Id. at 428.
101. Browne I, supra note 2, at 488.
102. See, e.g., Mindy Friedler, Leveling the Playing Field: How to Turn Fantasy Into Reality,
L. PRAc. MGMT., Sept. 1993, at 30.
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protected free speech and proscribable harassment that even individu-
als committed to both equality and free speech will disagree. But, dif-
ficult as the task might sometimes be, it must be undertaken,
consistent with the important constitutional rights at stake. Some
have advocated the simpler solution of allowing free speech to always
trump equality concerns, or vice versa. But any such approach was
well-answered by H.L. Mencken when he observed: "For every com-
plex problem, there is a solution which is simple, elegant . . . and
wrong." 103
103. Mark A. Hall & John D. Columbo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: To-
ward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH L. REV. 307, 330 n.76 (1991) (quoting H.L.
Mencken); see also United States v. McCoy, 32 M.J. 906, 909 (1991) ("For every complex prob-
lem there is a simple solution.., and it is usually wrong.") (attributing quote to H.L. Mencken);
Bing v. Florida, 492 So.2d 833, 835 n.9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ("For every complex problem
there is a solution that is short, simple and wrong.") (citing H.L. Mencken); United States v.
Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 264 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981) ("For every
complex problem there is usually a simple answer-and it's wrong.") (quoting H.L. Mencken).
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